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What drives patent performance of German biotech firms? The impact of R&D subsidies, knowledge networks and their location

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Abstract
This paper aims to explain whether firm-specific features, their engagement in collaboration networks and their location influence patent activity of biotech firms in Germany in the period 1997-2004. First, we demonstrate that non-collaborative R&D subsidies do not increase patent intensity of biotech firms. Second, the number of knowledge links biotech firms is also not influencing their patent performance. However, strong and robust evidence is found that some but not too much cognitive distance between actors involved in R&D collaborations increases patent performance of firms. Third, being located in a biotech cluster does positively impact on patent performance.

Keywords: relatedness, R&D subsidies, biotechnology, knowledge networks, proximity paradox

JEL codes: O33, O38, R58
1. Introduction

Knowledge-based economies have to maintain their technological advantage in the global competition. They need to keep in touch with the technological frontier and also invest in technologies, which are important in the future. In this context, biotechnology is assumed to be one of these promising technologies. Policy makers realized that the biotechnology sector became a cornerstone of economic growth in knowledge-based economies. Accordingly in the last decades many policy makers focused on biotechnology, when they tried to develop innovation strategies. This also holds for policy support in Germany. Cooke (2001) argues that Germany lags 20 years behind the USA in respect to the commercialization of the biotechnology industry and 10 years behind the UK. Therefore, the federal government recognized that it had to intensify its endeavours to wipe out the shortcoming of the German biotechnology sector, which was caused by the late start of this emerging industry in Germany. One of the first steps in supporting the German biotechnology industry started in 1995 when the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) announced the so-called BioRegio competition to strengthen industry. Moreover, the government aimed at stimulating the patent activities of German researchers. The proclaimed goal was to promote Germany to become the leading player in Europe in the biotechnology sector. Hence, it was a strategic aim to strengthen the global economic competitiveness of German enterprises in the biotechnology sector and in other biotechnology-influenced industrial sectors. After this initial program several others followed (e.g. BioFuture, BioProfile, BioChance).

Given the increasing role of public policy, this raises the question whether such public subsidies for private R&D projects\(^1\) positively affect the performance of bio-tech firms. Most studies that analyze R&D subsidies concentrate on their effects at the firm level (see, e.g., Brouwer et al. 1993, Busom 1999, Czarnitzki et al. 2007). Previous research on the effect of R&D subsidies on patenting activities mostly found a positive relationship (see, e.g., Czarnitzki and Hussinger 20004, Czarnitzki et al. 2007). Less attention has been focused on the systemic and collective character of learning processes and potential firm-spanning effects of the evaluated policy programs. There is increasing awareness that the position of firms in knowledge networks as well as their selection of partners is affecting their invention activities. In particular, the degree of cognitive distance with other network partners may be crucial in that respect, as some authors have suggested (Sorenson et al. 2006, Broekel and Boschma 2009, Boschma and Frenken 2010). In addition, geographers have stressed that location may also matter (e.g. Powell

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\(^1\) The policy support programs in the biotechnological field are not only focused on private R&D subsidies, but also on infrastructure or qualification, but a deliberate amount of the financial support is related to subsidies for R&D projects.
et al., 1996). Not only can the spatial concentration of R&D activities enhance geographically localized knowledge spillovers, but it may also be beneficial to connected to other regions with high R&D activities to provide access to extra-regional knowledge.

This paper has three objectives. The first objective is to assess the impact of R&D subsidies on patent performance of biotech firms. Based on a unique database of R&D subsidies in Germany, we will differentiate between subsidies granted to a single firm and those for joint R&D projects. Compared to the analysis of R&D subsidies in general, there is little research conducted on the question whether co-operative R&D activities have a specific effect on innovativeness (Dekker and Kleinknecht 2008, Schwarz et al. 2010). This is of increasing relevance since innovation policy tends to focus more and more on co-operative research activities. An interesting outcome of our study is that R&D subsidies that focus on single firms do not enhance the performance of biotech firms, while collaborative research subsidies (i.e. subsidies that are granted to joint R&D projects with two or more partners) do so to some extent.

The second objective is to estimate the effect of the position of firms in knowledge networks. The structure of these networks as well as the position of a single organization in these networks affects the knowledge pool the organizations have access to (Fornahl and Tran 2010). Previous research suggests that it is not only the structure of the network or a link to a partner in a joint R&D project that influences firms’ innovative success but also the composition of the knowledge base of the network partners: Boschma and Frenken (2009) claim that a positive result concerning knowledge exchange and performance depends on the (optimal) level of technological or cognitive proximity between partners in the network (see also, Nooteboom 2000, Broekel and Boschma 2009). Our study provides strong and robust evidence that, indeed, some but not too much cognitive distance with other actors involved in the R&D collaboration increases patent activity of firms.

The third objective is to investigate the effect of the geographic location on patent performance of German biotech firms. Many have suggested that co-located firms may benefit from local knowledge spillovers, especially when these concern firms active in the same technology fields. Others have suggested that local knowledge ties need to be supplemented by non-local knowledge ties, because access to extra-regional knowledge may be crucial (Bathelt et al. 2004, Ponds 2008, Ter Wal 2009). Interestingly, our study only finds evidence for the importance of being located in a biotech cluster while inter-regional linkages have no or even a negative effect on firm performance.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe a number of drivers of patent performance of firms, derived from the recent theoretical literature. Section 3 provides some background information on the biotechnology industry in Germany, the description of the
employed databases, the construction of the variables, and the methodology used. In Section 4, we will present and discuss the main findings. The last section concludes.

2. Theoretical background

There is a huge literature focussing on firm-internal features to explain the success of firms in learning and innovation. Many have suggested that R&D intensity of firms and the size of firms has a positive effect (Becker and Dietz 2004), while the age of firms has a negative effect on performance (Frenkel and Schefer 1998).

There also exists a rich literature on the effects of R&D subsidies. The main motivation for R&D subsidies is that investments in R&D are perceived to be below a social optimum. Too low R&D investments can be a result of uncertainty and high risks involved in research. For instance, the effects and costs of long-running innovation projects are difficult to measure ex-ante preventing solid investments plans (Cantwell 1999). Most of the studies investigate the effects of subsidies on firms’ R&D efforts (see, e.g., Busom 1999, Goerg and Strobl 2007), employment growth (see, e.g., Brouwer et al. 1993, Koski 2008), and collaboration and patenting activities (see, e.g., Czarnitzki and Hussinger 2004, Czarnitzki et al. 2007). The effects are generally found to be positive. A major concern in these studies is that public subsidies may “crowd out” private R&D investments (see Peters 2000). The empirical picture is still mixed, with more recent studies assigning a small relevance to crowding out (see, e.g., Czarnitzki et al. 2007).

In many knowledge-based industries, a firm must also have access to the most recent scientific and technical knowledge in order to successfully develop and market a product. Two aspects hinder the acquisition of external knowledge. Although many research results are published in scientific papers, which are publicly available, knowledge is not only complex, but also often tacit which both increase the difficulty and costs of knowledge transfer. The transfer of complex knowledge – where the results depend on the steps involved in getting there – or tacit knowledge typically requires that the sender helps the recipient to identify and correct mistakes in transmission (Sorenson et al. 2006). Intensive face-to-face interaction between the recipient and the possessor of the knowledge are necessary. Hence, knowledge, especially in fields like biotechnology, is generated by close contact with other experts in the field largely based upon collaborative research (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Stuart et al. 2007). The two most important sources of biotechnological knowledge are first universities as well as research organizations active in biotechnology and other closely related fields (Zucker and Darby 1996) and second, other existing biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies (Haug 1995).

Another argument for the importance of collaborative research is the observation that
many firms lack the resources to conduct large research and development projects on their own (Fritsch et al. 2005). These situations can be overcome by collaborating. However, free riding can reduce the benefits of collaborative agreements (see Heijs 2003). In such cases public subsidies may give firms the necessary pecuniary incentives to join their R&D efforts and accomplish large-scale research projects together. In this respect, R&D subsidies have an immediate resource effect by enlarging total R&D investments.

However, most of the existing studies evaluating R&D subsidies do not take into account the systemic character of innovation processes and potential firm-spanning effects of policy measures. In this respect they miss the effects of one firms’ behaviour on the activities of other organizations it is connected to in one way or the other. In this paper, we examine the effect of collaborative R&D in biotechnology. Most policy initiatives make R&D subsidies conditional on firms and other organizations forming teams, which guarantee extensive knowledge sharing. With this design policy aims at stimulating collective learning processes that increase overall innovation performance (see, e.g., Camagni 1991). Hence, policy measures affect individual firms and at the time their relationships with other organizations. This concerns primarily direct interaction between organizations, which allows them to learn from each other.

Besides direct links to partners firms and other organizations are embedded in a broader social context and systems of innovation (Boschma, 2005). Firms’ embeddedness in knowledge networks has increasingly been recognized as an important determinant of their economic and innovative performance (see, e.g., Powell et al. 1996, Walker et al. 1997). Ahuja (2000) analysed the impact of direct and indirect network links on the innovative performance – measured by patents – in the chemical industries in Western Europe, Japan and the USA. He found that direct or indirect ties stimulate innovative output. However certain combinations of both types of linkages yield negative effects. For example, direct ties seem to reduce the effect of indirect ones.

In this paper, we concentrate on two types of social context, namely firms embeddedness in knowledge networks as well as whether they are located within a biotechnology cluster. However, concerning the first, we have to point out that although (informal) social networks play an important role in accessing critical resources such as knowledge (Sorenson and Audia 2000), we primarily focus on formal knowledge interactions represented by subsidized research activities.

Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that the utilization of external knowledge depends on the different absorptive capacity of the firms. This determines not only their likelihood to engage in knowledge sharing but also the likelihood that obtained knowledge can be successfully used and implemented. Beside this firm-specific capability, the utilization of knowledge also depends
on the characteristics of the knowledge network as well as on the knowledge base of partners in this network. Cognitive proximity refers to the degree of overlap between those actors’ knowledge bases. Actors need to have a sufficient absorptive capacity to identify, interpret and exploit knowledge of other actors. Cantner and Meder (2007) find that cognitive proximity is relevant for cooperation activities. They demonstrate that the technological overlap between two actors (cognitive proximity) positively influences the likelihood of these actors to engage in cooperation.

Mowery et al. (1998) finds similar results and, moreover, suggests an inverted U-shape relationship between the probability to cooperate and the technological (cognitive) similarity of two actors. In a recent paper, Boschma and Frenken (2009) take up this idea and introduce what they describe as the so-called proximity paradox. While proximity may be a crucial driver for agents to connect and exchange knowledge, too much proximity between these agents might harm their innovative performance. So, while a high degree of proximity may be considered a prerequisite to make agents connected, proximity between agents does not necessarily increase their innovative performance, and may possibly even harm it. If two actors’ knowledge bases are too similar, the likelihood of an innovative recombination is lower than when dissimilar knowledge bases are merged (see, e.g., McEvily and Zaheer 1999). According to Nooteboom (2000), there exists a trade-off “.... between cognitive distance, for the sake of novelty, and cognitive proximity, for the sake of efficient absorption” (p. 152). Following Nooteboom’s work on optimal cognitive distance (Nooteboom 2000), Boschma and Frenken (2009) claim it depends on the (optimal) level of proximity whether a connection between agents will lead to higher innovative performance or not. In other words, both very proximate and very distant actors are likely to gain little from cooperating in innovation activities. The optimal level of cognitive proximity follows from the need to keep some cognitive distance (to stimulate new ideas through recombination) and to secure some cognitive proximity (to enable effective communication and knowledge transfer). Moreover, high cognitive proximity generally implies that two firms have very similar competences, which means that when they engage in knowledge exchange, they run a serious risk of weakening their competitive advantage with respect to the network partner. A study by Boschma and Broekel (2009) based upon the aviation industry in the Netherlands provides empirical evidence for the proximity paradox with respect to the similarity of the knowledge bases of the network partners.

Consequently, it is not so much the quantity of contacts and intensity of knowledge exchanges that matters for firms’ success, but rather the type of knowledge exchanged, and how that matches the existing knowledge base of the firms. In this respect, cooperation is most fruitful when network partners have technologically related, not similar knowledge bases.
Following the literature on knowledge networks (Giuliani and Bell 2005, Boschma and Ter Wal 2007, Sammarra and Biggiero 2008), we focus on the exchange of technological knowledge in R&D activities, which is regarded as most relevant for firms’ innovation activities in this sector. Second, we examine whether cognitive proximity matter for firms’ innovation performance. We also test whether there is a curvilinear relationship between the cognitive dimensions and innovative performance. Doing so, we determine whether the proximity paradox related to cognitive or technological proximity holds for the German biotechnology industry.

In addition to the effects of embeddedness in knowledge networks, it is also argued that companies in localised industrial clusters experience higher innovation rates than those outside clusters (Audretsch and Feldman 1996, Baptista and Swann 1998). The positive effect of clusters on innovation activities mainly result from localised learning process (Malmberg and Maskell 2006). Such localised learning depends on two factors. The first describes local capabilities that are “some forms of knowledge creation and exchange that are still very much rooted in the cultural, institutional, and social structures of particular places” (ibid.: 3) or the access to local resources. The second factor involves the influence of spatial proximity on interaction. Knowledge exchange in spatial proximity can take place in several ways such as direct interactions based on collaborations, monitoring of other firm’s activities, social contacts between employees or through labour mobility. Such positive effects are identified in several empirical approaches. Baptista (2000) shows that innovations are spread more quickly within regional clusters than outside these clusters. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) compare the location of innovative activity of 210 industries that are in different phases of the industry life cycle. They find out that geographically concentrated companies do exhibit a disproportionately high innovation rate during the growth phase of the industry. Conversely, companies outside clusters are more innovative during later stages. They conclude that “the positive agglomeration effects during the early stages of the industry life cycle are replaced by congestion effects during the later stages of the industry life cycle” (Audretsch and Feldman 1996: 253). Since we examine the German biotech industry in the 1990s; which can be considered as an industry in an early stage of the life cycle, we expect a positive effect of being located inside an industrial cluster.

Besides this positive effect of local interactions and localisation externalities, in order to sustain a regional competitive advantage, local interactions and outside linkages must be balanced in order to generate synergies and to introduce new knowledge at the same time (Albino et al. 1999; Bathelt et al. 2004). Such outside linkages bring new knowledge into the cluster and prevent lock-ins. Furthermore, most biotechnology firms compete on a world market and accordingly also have to access knowledge their competitors from regions or nations outside their home region have access to. Hence, we expect those regions with a high degree of inter-
regional connections to generate more innovations than regions fewer external connections.

3. Empirical Background

3.1 The German Biotechnology Industry

Patent activities in emerging markets have always been dynamic. In this respect, the patent activity in the German biotechnology sector is no exception, but the growth process took several years to start and to show a significant increase. Figure 1 illustrates the general evolution of German biotechnology patent applications in comparison to the development in the USA in the period from 1986 to 2005. The number of patent applications grew very slowly in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s in Germany. The level as well as the dynamics of the activities in the USA was higher during these years. This motivated the German government to introduce a whole set of innovation policy programs in order to increase the number of firms as well as the number of innovations. These policies targeted a wide variety of issues including for example, the transfer of university knowledge to private firms, the stimulation of collaborative R&D activities, and support for local clusters. From the development of the German patent applications one can conclude that Germany did not lose ground to the USA, but was able to catch-up. After the year 2000 (with around 1,500 patents) the number of patents decreased in both countries. The decreasing number of patent applications likely refers to the burst of the New Economy Bubble. This limited the availability of venture capital and hence the necessary financial resources for further explorations. The very low figures – especially for the USA – in 2005 are affected by a right truncation of the data. But in general German biotechnology organizations were better able to compensate the downturn after 2000.

Figure 1 about here

A closer look on the organizations in the top 10 lists for 1994-1995 and 2003-2005 reveals that a high number of organizations left the top 10 ranking while others entered. In general the patenting activities are dominated by multinational firms while public research organizations only playing a minor role (concerning the direct activities). From these findings we can conclude that the size of the firm (measured by employees or the patent stock) is likely impacting its innovative activities. However, at the same time some size-independent volatility can be observed in the activity levels of firms.

For the identification of the biotechnology firms in Germany we rely on the German Biotechnology Year and Address Book (versions 2002 and 2004), which covers around 750 firms and many research organizations. The directory contains information on, for example, the
location, the number of employees, the existence of a research laboratory and the central research fields the firms are active in. For 399 of these firms we can extract the necessary firm-level data for our analysis.

Table 1 about here

3. 2. The subsidies database and the identification of collaboration
In the present paper, we use data on R&D projects that were subsidized by the German federal government. In a similar manner as most other advanced countries the German federal government is actively supporting public and private research and development activities with R&D subsidies programs (Czarnitzki et al. 2007). For example, in 2001 in total 7,227,838,000 Euro were spent on these measures. In 2008 this sum grew to 9,126,670,000 Euro (BMBF 2008a). While the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) is the primary source of this type of funding, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) contribute as well. In addition to the federal ministries also the ministries of the federal states provide significant funding programs. Nevertheless, the federal level is still the more important one (Hassink 2002) and hence we concentrate our analysis on those programs initiated by the federal ministries.

The above-mentioned federal ministries publish comprehensive information on the supported projects in the so-called “Förderkatalog” (subsidies catalogue), which is accessible via the website www.foerderkatalog.de. It lists detailed information on more than 110,000 individual grants that were supported between 1960 and 2009. Amongst this information are a grant’s starting and ending date, a title including a very short description, the granting sum, the name and location of the receiving organization, as well as a classification number. In the following some of this information are explained in more detail.

The classification number (in German “Leistungsplansystematik”) is an internal classification scheme developed by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and consists of 16 main classes, which include biotechnology, energy research, sustainable development, health and medicine. These main classes are split into a varying number of sub-classes. These are considerably fine-grained as they allow for instance the differentiation between photonics (class: I25020), optoelectronics (class: I25010), plant genomics (K04210), and micro-organic genomics (K024220). While the classification scheme takes into account technological differences it also covers non-technological activities, which is why we refer to its classes in the following as activities. At the highest level of disaggregation (six-digit level) more than 1,100 unique activity classes have been assigned to projects between

Most importantly, the title of the project contains information on the collaborative or non-collaborative nature of projects. More precise collaborative projects are labelled as “Verbundprojekt” or “Verbundvorhaben”, which marks joined and collaborative projects, respectively. Organizations that participate in such a project agree to a number of regulations among which the following are the most important ones (self-translated extract of the information sheet concerning the application of subsidies for joined projects (BMBF 2008b)):

1. Every partner is authorized to make unrestricted use of the project’s results.
2. Intensive collaboration is the basis for finding solutions.
3. Within the scope of the project, partners grant each other a positive and free-of-charge covenant on their know-how, copy and intellectual property rights, which existed before a project’s start.

Amongst the project’s results inventions have a special status. Extraordinary contributions to an invention have to be acknowledged.

While the first three points allow for intensive knowledge exchange, the fourth point provides incentives for innovation. Partners negotiate about how to deal with inventions and who receives the exclusive right of use. However, the partner with the most significant contribution to the invention is granted a strong position.

Accordingly, two organizations are connected if they participate in the same joint project because this represents strong knowledge links with a significant potential for knowledge sharing. We manually identify such joint projects on the basis of the title entry in the database. In general, it is a first indication of a joint project if the title contains words like “Verbundprojekt”, “Verbundvorhaben”, “Forschungsverbund”, and “Verbund”. In other cases projects have the same title but no indication on if it is a joined project or not. This applies for example to certain special cases as e.g. the collaborative network created for the analysis of genes (“Genomforschungsnetz”). In this case an Internet search on the title was conducted to retrieve additional information. If no definite indication for a joint project is found the project is treated as non-collaborative. However, it turns out that some of these joint projects are really large scale including more than 100 actors. It seems to be however unlikely that knowledge exchange takes equally place among all of these actors. We therefore apply a more conservative approach. In many cases, the title / description includes information on the structure of the project. More precise, very frequently these joint projects are divided into work packages (“Teilvorhaben”, “Teilprojekt”). In case a joint project is divided into at least two work packages and each work

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2 The classification scheme as well as the assignment of projects to activity classes has been subject to some change over the years Czarnitzki et al. 2002. However, our data is affected only marginally.
package includes at least two partners, we defined only those organizations to be linked that participate in the same work package. In general about thirty percent of all projects in the database are projects in which more than one actor participates.

3.3 Construction of variables

To approximate a firm’s innovation activities, we collected information on firms’ yearly patent activities from 1997 to 2004. The patent data is derived from the EPO Worldwide Statistical Patent Database version October 2007 (PATSTAT October 2007 database). We assumed that all patents with economic importance respectively all patents for which the patent applicant presumes that their invention will be important on the global market are filed at the EPO or go through the filing process of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Hence, we just focus on patents filed at these two organizations. In the next step all patents belonging to the biotechnology field are identified by means of the International Patent Classification (IPC) and the OST2/INPI/ISI Concordance in the version of 2000 where the IPCs are classified in 30 technological fields. A biotechnology patent in our analysis therefore means that a patent has at least one IPC code which falls into the category of the technological field ‘biotechnology’. For the analysis of the origin of the patents we searched the names of the firms from the Biotechnology Year and Address Book in the PATSTAT database. By merging the list of firms with the patent list it was possible to identify all patents with at least one applicant listed in our core firm directory. We weighted the number of patents for each applicant by the amount of applicants on the patent. Hence, if there are, for example, two applicants on a patent both are assigned 0.5 patents. This number is summed over all patents a firm (co-) applied for resulting in our dependent variable (PAT), which can be interpreted as the number of patents weighted by the number of co-applicants.

The first firm-level independent variable is straightforwardly created. Using the information on a firm’s founding date their age in each considered year is estimated (AGE). Secondly, we know their employment in the years 2002 and 2004. Our patent data ranges however from 1997 to 2004. Employment information for the missing years is however not available, which is why we have to approximate it. In case of 2003 this is easily defined as the mean between employment in 2002 and 2004. For the other years we have to take a different approach. From Müller (2003) we know the yearly employment growth rates in the biotechnology industry from 1997 to 2002. The first employment set-up simply adapts all firms’ employment according to the yearly growth rates, which implies that they all have the same growth rate. The resulting employment numbers are denoted as EMPL_{av}. In the second set-up we take into account each firm’s deviation from the average employment growth of the sample firms
between 2002 and 2004. The industry’s growth rate is then adapted by this deviation yielding firm individual growth rates for the years 1997 to 2002. The variable \( \text{EMPL}_{SF} \) captures the obtained employment numbers. In the analyses we primarily use the latter employment number because we think they are the better approximation. \( \text{EMPL}_{AV} \) is rather employed for robustness checks.\(^3\)

In order to account for localization economies we include a technological cluster coefficient (CI) for each single year. This index is a modified version of the industrial cluster coefficient suggested by Sternberg and Litzenberger (2004) but in contrast to them using the number of employees, we consider the number of patents generated by organizations located in the 97 German planning regions (“Raumordnungsregionen”) as the core variable. In addition this index accounts for the number of inhabitants, the size of the region and the number of patenting organizations to generate an index which is comparable between regions. The index is presented in Figure 2. From the results we can conclude that there exist seven technological biotech clusters in Germany with very high levels of patenting activities: Berlin, Göttingen, Hamburg, Munich, Rhine-Main, the Rhineland and Rhine-Neckar. In the empirical approach we will test whether single firms located in such clusters can benefit from the activities of neighbouring firms.

**Figure 2 about here**

On the basis of the subsidies data previously presented, information is easily obtained on the amount of subsidies each firm receives in a particular year. Hereby, the information on the receiving organization is used to match the subsidies data to the firm characteristics data previously presented. Given that the patent data covers the period 1997 to 2004 and the existence of a time lag between patent data and received subsidies, we collect the subsidies data for the period 1992 to 2004. More precise we consider all supported projects that started before December 31\(^{st}\) 2004 and ended after January 1\(^{st}\) 1995. The database is furthermore limited to projects concerning biotechnology. Accordingly, all projects are considered that fall into activity class “K” in the “Förderkatalog”. About 3,329 projects belong into this category in the considered time period. These projects correspond to 928 individual actors receiving subsidies. 170 of these are matched firms for which patent and employment numbers have been collected. Hence, of the 399 firms about 42% received some sort of subsidies in this period.

The first subsidies variable created captures the amount of total subsidies a firm received in a particular year (SUBS). For a more detailed analysis this variable is split into the amount of subsidies attributed to non-collaborative projects (SUM) and the summed grants of collaborative

\(^3\) Both \( \text{AGE} \) and \( \text{EMPL} \) are furthermore employed as proxies for firm internal R&D efforts (budget, personell). We expect that these two variables should capture at least some effects of internal R&D.
projects (CSUM). As we have information on the exact starting and ending date of a project the amount is estimated accurate to the day. Non-collaborative projects are defined as projects with just one receiving actor. Collaborative projects are those that have more than one receiving actor. For both variables we are also considering squared versions, whereby the mean is subtracted beforehand to avoid multicollinearity. In case of collaborative projects we moreover estimate the average amount per collaborative subsidies grant (PCSUM). This is motivated to separate network effects (which depend on the number of collaborative projects) from the effects of large grants received for a single project.

Next, we construct for each year from 1995 to 2004 the year specific collaboration network in biotechnology on the basis of the subsidized projects. On average the so created networks consist of 311 actors. Of these 35 to 97 actors match our firm characteristics data.

**Figure 3 about here**

Figure 3 displays the subsidised network for the year 2001. There is one large component being composed of most of the organizations, several smaller subcomponents, and some isolated actors. Some further network characteristics of the corresponding networks are presented in Table 3 in the Appendix. On the basis of these networks for each actor we compute the degree and the betweenness centrality (Freeman 1979, Wasserman and Faust 1994). Centrality describes in general how central an actor is in a network. We use the most straightforward measure of centrality: degree centrality. It represents an actor’s number of links.

\[ C_D = \sum_{i=1}^{s} C_D(n_i) \]

whereby \( n_i \) indicates a link. Similarly, betweenness centralization refers to the extent to which actors’ shortest paths connections run through the same nodes. An actor receives the maximum value if his surround network corresponds to a perfect star. It can be estimated by:

\[ C_B(n_i) = \sum_{j \neq k} g_{jk}(n_i)/g_{jk} \]

with \( g_{jk} \) as the geodesic distance (shortest path) between actor \( j \) and \( k \). The two variables are denoted by DEGREE (for degree) and BETW (for betweenness).

To capture the geographic dimension of the network the variable DISTANCE is defined as the mean geographic distance measured in kilometres between a firm and its collaboration partners.

As the last firm-level variable, we define a technological similarity measure. We follow the suggestions of Broekel and Boschma (2009), which rely on the approach by Breschi et al. (2003) to measure technological relatedness. In order to define the similarity between two actors
these authors compare the similarity of their technological profiles. While Broekel and Boschma (2009), rely on self-collected NACE code information\(^4\) and Breschi et al. (2003) on patent classes, we make once more use on the data in the subsidies database. More precisely, we use the activity classification scheme of the “Förderkatalog”, i.e. the “Leistungsplansystematik”). As pointed out above, each project has an activity class assigned corresponding to the content of the project.

In a first step, all projects are identified an actor participated in each year from 1997 to 2004. This includes also non-biotechnology related projects. It shows however that on average 87% (standard deviation: 0.23) of the projects the firms in our sample engage in are classified as biotechnology. On this basis a “Leistungsplansystematik” profile is created, which corresponds to the vector of an actor’s six-digit activity classes.

For the second step, we need a measure of two activity classes’ similarity. For this, we rely on the similarity matrix developed by Broekel (2010). He counts the number of activity classes’ co-occurrences at the organization level for the complete database ranging from 1960 to 2009. The basic idea is that if an organization is frequently engaged in projects of activity A as well as in projects of activity B both activities are assumed to be similar. Accordingly, the frequency of co-occurrences gives an intuitive similarity indicator. In a similar manner as Breschi et al. (2003) and Ejermo (2003) he also considers indirect relations between two activities in addition to the direct described above. This means that if activity A is frequently assigned to the same organizations as activity C, and the same is true for activities B and C, A and B must also be similar. In practice, the Cosine index is estimated as given in Ejermo (2003) on page 10:

\[
    r_{xz} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{i} w_{xj} w_{yk}}{\sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{i} w_{xj}^2} \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{i} w_{yk}^2}}
\]

with \(n\) as the number of activities (1114) and \(g, k,\) and \(z\) as indices of activities under consideration. In this equation, \(w_{xj}\) is the number with which activities \(z\) and \(k\) coincide at the organizational level.

With this information at hand a matrix \(M\) is constructed relating the activity classes of firm A to those of firm B, which shows the similarity values of each class pair. However, we need a single value expressing the similarity of their technological problems. This is in so far problematic as commonly organizations engage in projects classified into different activities and

\(^4\) NACE codes refer to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community.
no information is available on the share of turnover or employees attributed to each activity.\footnote{In principle one could use the project’s grants to weight the importance of each class. This assumes that the size of a project (in terms of money) is a good approximation of an activity’s importance for a firm.} We solve this problem by using two different measures. In the first, we search for the most similar pair of activities in the two activities-profiles. More precisely, we compare two organizations’ \((i,j)\) vectors of activities \((T_i\) and \(T_j)\). In practice, we take the maximum value found in matrix \(M\). This value is taken as similarity index \(\text{SIM}^{\text{max}}\). Because the values of the Cosine index \(r_{xg}\) are between 0 and 1, the similarity index ranges from 0 and 1 as well, with 1 indicating perfect similarity. In extreme cases, all of organization \(i\)’s activities are compared to one class of organization \(j\). The rationale for this indicator is that if two organizations engage in at least one similar activity a basis exists for efficient communication. The index can be interpreted as the maximal overlap of two organizations’ knowledge bases.

In light of the proximity paradox discussion, we expect an inverted u-shaped relationship of this index with firms’ innovation performance. Therefore, a quadratic term of this indicator is considered. Because this may introduce severe multicollinearity, the mean of the variable is subtracted before being squaring. Hence \(\text{SIM}^2\) will be large for small and large values of similarity.

While the first indicator puts a lot of weight on a single technology pair, a second similarity indicator is constructed, which can be regarded as average similarity (\(\text{SIM}_{\text{av}}\)). In this case, it is assumed that all technologies assigned to an organization account for equal turnover (employment) shares. Then a similarity indicator can be defined as the average similarity of two organizations’ technology profiles by simply calculating the mean of matrix \(M\). We believe the first indicator to be more appropriate, which is why we primarily use the second one to test the results’ robustness. In general, this second is a more conservative measure of similarity. In a similar manner as for the first measure a squared version of this indicated is employed (\(\text{SIM}_{\text{av}}^2\)).

The following variables are defined at the regional level to test for additional regional effects on firms’ innovation performance – besides the pure cluster index presented above. For their construction we use the entire data set of subsidized biotechnology R&D projects between 1995 and 2004 included in the “Förderkatalog”. This applies to 3,265 entries and 920 unique actors engaging in 2,028 projects. All actors have been assigned to the according planning region allowing for an aggregation of their data at the regional level. On this basis \(\text{ROR\_SUM}\) and \(\text{ROR\_CSUM}\) represent the summed non-collaborative and collaborative subsidies grants at the level of the 97 German planning regions. \(\text{ROR\_DEGREE}\) captures a region’s degree centrality in the regional network of subsidized R&D collaboration and \(\text{ROR\_BETWEEN}\) the corresponding betweeness centrality.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of SUM for the year 2001 over the planning regions. This map at least at first glance corresponds to the biotechnological cluster map (Figure 2) with especially Munich, Berlin and Hamburg receiving over 80 Mio. Euros.

In Figure 5 the links between the planning regions for the year 2001 based upon joint subsidised projects are represented. Peculiarly the Munich region in the south is well connected to other German biotech regions while other clusters such as Hamburg or Göttingen are only weakly connected. Hence, the clusters seem to have different levels of external connections.

4. Explaining innovative success

4.1 Method

Some descriptives and the correlations of the above-described variables are shown in Table 4 and in the Appendix.

We have to decide upon the correct lag structure between subsidies and patent data. It is well known that at least one year passes before an invention is turned into a patent application. The patent office usually needs a minimum of one year to proof and decide upon the application. Accordingly, at least two years go by before an invention is finally patented. We know the starting date of the funded R&D projects and in most instances the work starts at that very date. However, the project does not deliver inventions right from the start but rather at least one, maybe even two years, of work need to be invested. In light of this a reasonable time lag between R&D subsidies and patents should be 3 to 4 years. Hence, we test both lags separately, but in the following we mostly present the results of the 4th lag scenario since the results for the 4th and 3rd lag are overlapping to a large degree. Note that this time lag applies to all measures based on subsidies data, which includes all network and similarity measures.

In general all variables based on the subsidies data are estimated for the years 1992-2004. The patent data and most firm characteristics have been collected for the time period 1997-2004. Some firms however started later than 1997. In fact in 1997 only 218 out of 399 firms exist, in 1998 this number increases to 269, in 1999 to 319, and by 2002 to sample is complete. For the panel regression this means that we have to deal with an unbalanced panel. The Hausman test moreover indicates that fixed-effects models (chisq = 78.35, df=9, p-value = 0.000) are

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6 We also estimated the models for a two years lag to assess the robustness of the results. However, while the short lags structure makes the model less plausible the results change only little, which is why we don’t report these models. The results for the 2nd and 3rd lag scenarios can be obtained upon request from the authors.
consistent and hence to be used. Our dependent variable is over-dispersed with zeros (2776 zero to 466 non-zero values). Despite the splitting of patents by the number of co-applications, it remains a type of count data.\textsuperscript{7} We therefore employ a negative binominal regression panel approach. Its fixed effects specification however has one advantage: the value of an observation’s dependent variable is required to change at least once. This reduces the number of observations significantly (in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} lag scenario down to 132 firms and 747 observations, in the 4\textsuperscript{th} lag scenario even to 109 firms with 569 observations).\textsuperscript{8}

The correlation structure of the variables (presented in Table 5 in the Appendix) reveals that both similarity measures (SIM\textsubscript{max} and SIM\textsubscript{av}) are highly correlated, which is why we stick to SIM\textsubscript{max} in the following. Moreover, the dummy for 1998 causes some multicolinearity problems in the 4 lags scenario forcing us to drop it in the analyses. Some variables (e.g. EMPL, AGE, and the amounts of subsidies) are strongly skewed. In the estimations we correct for this by taking the log.

\textbf{Table 2 about here}

\subsection*{4.2 Results}

Table 2 shows the results of the negative binominal panel regression for the 4\textsuperscript{th} lag scenario. In all models, we find the year dummies positive and significant. This indicates an increasing patent intensity over the years during our period of investigation.

First, we report on the firm-specific features of our estimations. As shown in Table 2, size has a strong and positive effect on patent intensity of bio-tech firms in Germany. This is in line with other studies showing that large firms have advantages in patenting and innovating (Becker and Dietz 2004). The insignificance of age however contradicts the literature that stresses that younger firms in high-tech industries are more innovative (Frenkel and Schefer 1998). There might be three explanations for this finding: a) the young firms really have just started their business and were not yet able to patent, b) large firms might have co-operated with younger firms to generate patents and c) as previous research has shown old incumbent firms are very well able to generate innovations (Chandy and Tellis 2000). We also tested for the influence of the total amounts of R&D subsidies at the firm level (SUBS). Here, we found a positive and significant effect. Then, we split R&D subsidies into collaborative (CSUM) and non-

\textsuperscript{7} The data is transformed into integer values by multiplying with 100 and rounding up to the next full count. This transformation does not impact the results.

\textsuperscript{8} We also run some alternative models including a lagged dependent variable, which however does not impact the results. Considering this variable may however cause problems of serially correlated disturbance, which is why we don’t report the results. They can be obtained upon request from the authors.
collaborative subsidies (SUM). The most interesting finding is the non-significance of non-collaborative R&D subsidies in all specifications. In other words, we do not find any support for a positive effect of non-collaborative subsidies. In the lag 4 specification, this is also true for collaborative R&D subsidies. However, in the lag 3 specification, the coefficient of collaborative subsidies turns into a positive and significant effect. Accordingly, large amounts of collaborative subsidies seem to yield benefits with a 3 year lag at the firm level. In the case of collaborative subsidies, we also estimated the effect of the average amount a firm received per collaborative subsidy (PCSUM), but in all specifications, this variable is insignificant. Thus, overall, we found very little evidence of R&D subsidies affecting the performance of biotech firms.

Second, we present the results with respect to the network variables. We first tested the effect of degree centrality (DEG), that is, the number of R&D links a firm has. In all model specifications, this variable was insignificant, suggesting that patent performance is not affected by the degree of connectivity in the collaboration network. Considering betweeness centrality (BETW) instead of degree centrality did not yield any significant results at the firm level either. However, we found evidence for a network effect when we account for the type of partners that are involved. As shown in Table 2, the firm’s average cognitive similarity with its collaboration partners (SIM\textsuperscript{MAX}) has a positive effect on the patent activity of firms in all model specifications. In other words, the higher the cognitive distance with network partners, the higher the patent performance of the biotech firm. In line with Boschma (2005), we also tested whether too much cognitive proximity (as too much cognitive distance with network partners) harms the patent performance of firms. For that purpose, we added a quadratic term for this variable (SIM\textsuperscript{MAX}\textsuperscript{2}). As expected, the coefficient of this variable is negative and significant, at least in the 4-lag specification. In other words, for technological similarity, we found considerable evidence for an inverted-U shape relationship between technological similarity with network partners and patent performance of biotech firms. This finding is in line with the cognitive proximity paradox (Boschma and Frenken, 2010) and highlights the importance of collaborating with the right partners.

To shed more light on this latter relationship, we ran non-parametric bivariate regressions with the patent numbers as dependent and SIM\textsuperscript{MAX} (in the 4\textsuperscript{th} lag model). We use a cross-validation method for smoothing the parameters as given in Bowman and Azzalini (1997). Figure 6 shows the resulting scatter plot and the fitted curves as well as their bootstrapped error bands. Note that we cut some very large observations of PAT for visual reasons. See Table 4 in the Appendix for the maximum values of PAT. In case of SIM\textsuperscript{MAX}, the inverted u-shape is clearly

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9 We also tested for non-linear effects in case of the subsidies variables but did not find any indication of such, which is why we don’t report these findings.
visible and seems to be robust in the plot.

**Figure 6 about here**

Thus, overall, we found no evidence that intensive collaboration or a central position in R&D collaboration networks is sufficient to increase patent performance. What matters is being connected to partners that have access to similar but not too similar knowledge bases, i.e. to partners that have complementary or related competences.

Third, we report the findings on the regional level. We found that the cluster index has a positive and significant effect on patent performance in all model specifications. Apparently, being located in a biotechnology cluster with high levels of patenting activities positively impacts on the patent activities of single firms. Hence, the more active the local biotech cluster is in generating innovation, the more single firms can profit from being located in such a cluster. This finding supports the argument that localised learning and localisation economies push innovative activities in regions. In contrast, subsidies play only a minor role with regard to enforcing patent activities. The total sum of R&D subsidies at the regional level (ROR_SUBS) does not enhance patent activity. When we distinguish between collaborative and non-collaborative projects at the regional level (ROR_CSUM and ROR_SUM, respectively), we only found some evidence for a positive effect of ROR_CSUM in some specifications of the 4th lag approach, but not in the 3rd approach. This latter result might capture a tendency of local biotech firms to collaborate more – especially if supported by subsidies, which leads to a positive regional spillover effect on patent performance of firms. Subsidies directed to single firms do not have a positive effect on innovative performance and in one model even a negative one can be identified. Last, we tested whether biotech firms may benefit from being connected to other biotech regions in Germany, through which inter-regional biotech knowledge may flow into the region (ROR_DEGREE). As shown in Table 5, this latter variable has a negative effect in the 4th lag specification\(^\text{10}\). Accordingly, being located in regions in which actors collaborate a lot with actors from many different regions decreases firms’ patent performance. While surprising on a first glimpse, the finding is in line with the results of Broekel and Meder (2008) that observed a negative relationship between high levels of inter-regional collaboration and regional innovation efficiency. We also tested the average distance to collaboration partners (DISTANCE), which however does not seem to be related to firms’ innovation performance.

Thus, in sum, our findings suggest that co-located biotech firms do benefit from local knowledge spillovers and collaborative subsidies in the region, but they do not gain from inter-

\(^{10}\) ROR\_BETWEEN is however not significant.
regional knowledge network ties – a high number of ties even might have a negative effect.

5. Conclusion

The aim of the paper was to analyze the impact of firm-specific features, network features and location on firms’ patent activities in the German biotechnology industry. We made use of an unique database that includes the granted amount of R&D subsidies a biotech firm received between 1997 and 2004. The study contributes to the existing literature by considering the embeddedness of firms’ R&D activities into knowledge networks as well as their participation in collaborative R&D projects. In addition, it was explored how the similarity of a firm with its collaboration partners impacts the success of its R&D activities.

We identified three core results. First, our study found in general very little evidence of R&D subsidies affecting the patent performance of German biotech firms. While there is little research on the effectiveness of collaborative R&D subsidies, our R&D subsidy database allowed us to isolate the effect of subsidies focused on joint R&D projects. A key finding of our study is that R&D subsidies that focus on single firms do not enhance the performance of biotech firms, while collaborative research subsidies (i.e. subsidies that are granted to joint R&D projects with two or more partners) do so to some extent.

Second, our study investigated whether the position of a firm in the knowledge network influences firms’ R&D success, and whether the composition of the knowledge base of the network partners had any effect on that. We showed that a high quantity of R&D connections to other organizations has no effect on the patent activity of firms. Hence, the pure quantity of knowledge links does not determine the success of R&D activities. Our analysis showed that the network effect only becomes manifest when accounting for the type of network partners a firm is linked to. Our analyses found strong evidence that some but not too much cognitive distance with other actors involved in the R&D collaboration increased patent activity of firms. In other words, there seems to exist an optimal cognitive distance between co-operation partners that provides the possibility to understand each other, but which enables firms to learn something really new at the same time.

Third, we found evidence that the location in a technological cluster mattered for the patent performance of German biotech firms. Co-located biotech firms do benefit from local knowledge spillovers, but did they do not benefit from inter-regional knowledge network ties. Nor does the average geographical distance of network partners affect the patent activity of biotech firms. This result is interesting, given the emphasis of much of the literature on the positive effects of spatial clustering on knowledge spillovers (which is confirmed in our study), and the importance of having access to extra-regional knowledge through non-local knowledge
ties (which is not confirmed). However, the latter result is in line with very recent literature that suggests that it is not access to knowledge networks (Boschma and Frenken 2009) per se which affects innovativeness. What seems to matter for real learning is who are the network partners, and especially whether partners bring complementary or related knowledge into the network. Although we know from other research that in many cases being located in cluster is not sufficient for learning and innovation processes (Giuliani and Bell, 2005; Boschma and Ter Wal, 2007) our cluster index variable seems to capture underlying structures or externalities which positively impact firms’ innovation activities.

These results call for further research. To name but a few, we did not have information on firms’ R&D activities (personnel, budget). This is only partly captured by including the age and the number of employees as proxies. More detailed information on firms’ internal R&D activities might yield different results. Furthermore, it might be interesting to disentangle the positive effect of being located in a technological cluster by analysing more in detail the joint knowledge production and diffusion inside the regions. And lastly some additional insights might be gained to by adding measures of heterogeneity on the firm and regional level in addition to the similarity measure on the network level to account for the positive or negative effect of diversification on firm’s innovativeness.

These findings deliver some insights for policy makers as well firms active in R&D activities. Policy makers should rethink their R&D subsidy strategies because we found little evidence that R&D subsidies positively affect the success of R&D in terms of patenting. Our results suggest that policy makers and firms have to take into account the structure of network relations and the composition of partners, in order to increase the success of R&D. Firms should concentrate on selected linkages concerning quantity as well as quality. With regard to quality those partner having the optimal technological distance to the own knowledge base should be selected, and policy makers should consider these findings in the set-up of policy initiatives as well.
Appendix

Figure 1: Patent applications in the biotechnology field by applicants (priority year, weighted-counts by applicants)
Figure 2: Biotechnological clusters in Germany (based on Cluster Index, average values 1997-2004)
**Figure 3**: Firm level subsidy network in 2001
Figure 4: Regional distribution of subsidies (SUM in Mio. Euro)
Figure 5: German biotechnology collaborations in 2001

Figure 6: SIMmax and weighted patents
Table 1: Top ranking of organizations based on patent applications

<table>
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<td>20.7</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>10.2</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>BOEHRINGER MANNHEIM GMBH</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>EPIGENOMICS AG</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Dade Behring Marburg GmbH</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>Degussa GmbH</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>AVENTIS PHARMA DEUTSCHLAND GMBH</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH</td>
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<td>FHG ZUR FOERDERUNG DER ANGEWANDTEN FORSCHUNG E.V.</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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</table>

Note: the organisations displayed in bold are public research institutes.

Notes: Coefficient values shown as zeros in the table are very small, but larger than zero.
63 groups (63 obs.) dropped because of only one obs. per group, 209 groups (990 obs.) dropped because of all zero outcomes

Number of obs. = 569, number of groups = 109
Table 2: Regression results (Negative binominal regression with fixed-effects; independent variable: number of patents per firm and year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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<td>0,565*** 0,011</td>
<td>0,510** 0,020</td>
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Obs. per group: min = 2, avg. = 5,2, max = 6
### Table 3: Network characteristics

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### Table 4 Descriptives

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National Academy of Sciences, 93, 12709-12716.